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This paper addresses the puzzle of why the same workplace employment relations regimes can 
lead to different performances and why different regimes can produce the same performance. 
It is argued that the incidence of mutual, and not necessarily unilateral, trust between the 
employee representation and the management accounts for these differences, as mutual trust 
fosters information sharing and helps to strike deals that are mutually beneficial. Against the 
background that the institutional and organisational characteristics of some workplace 
employment relations regimes also constitutes information sharing and joint decision making, 
we further argue that mutual trust is a functional equivalent. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
Methodologically the article is international and cross-country comparative in nature and 
conducted on the basis of a unique, large, and transnational comparable data set of the 
employment relationship at firm level in eleven countries.  
 
Findings 
Our results show that strong mutual trust is associated with significantly higher incidences of 
increases in firm profitability, regardless of the workplace employment relations regime in 
which the firms are embedded.   
 
Practical implications  
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The results clearly indicate that trust between the employee representation and the management 
works as a functional equivalent to performance enhancing employment relations regimes. 
Therefore, some policy recommendations and imposed institutional reforms of employment 
relations regimes by the IMF and the European Central Bank in some countries are sub-optimal 
and might not have been necessary. Trust building initiatives between the employee 
representation and the management are therefore an alternative, which is less conflictual and 
could have the same effect on the performance of firms.  
 
Originality/value  
Previous analyses on differences in the performance effects of workplace employment relations 
regime concentrated almost exclusively on institutional factors. Factors that account for 
differences in the functioning of regimes such as in particular the role of trust were not 
considered before. Against this background, the originality of this analysis is that it clearly 
shows that it is not sufficient to consider only the institutional and organisational structure of 
regimes, but it is essential for a better understanding of the effects of the employment 






There is agreement in the academic literature that the institutional and organizational structure 
of the employment relationship, i.e. the formal legal framework and the way the employee and 
the employer side interact, can vary substantially across countries, sectors, and companies (e.g. 
Amossé et al., 2016; Aumayr et al., 2011; Bechter et al., 2012; Crouch, 1993; Forth et al., 2017; 
Meardi, 2018). There also appears to be agreement in the literature that differences in the 
institutional and organizational structure are able to explain differences in outcomes such as 
for example differences in the wages and working conditions of employees, differences in job 
quality, as well as differences in the performance, e.g. profitability, of firms (e.g. Bayo-
Moriones et al., 2013; Metcalf, 1993).  
However, there is less agreement in the academic literature as well as in political and 
policymaking debates (e.g. European Commission, 2015; OECD 2004) about which 
institutional and organizational structures are associated with which effects, and which 
structures are comparatively more beneficial. This uncertainty in literature is also based on the 
empirical puzzle that different institutional structures are not only associated with the same 
outcomes and ‘different organizational forms may be capable of similar performance’ (OECD, 
2004 p.166), but also that the same structures may be associated with different outcomes (e.g. 
Baccaro, 2014).  
In this paper we argue that one important reason for this puzzle in the literature is that 
previous studies, which focused primarily on the effect of the institutional and organizational 
structures themselves, did not sufficiently consider other factors which may affect the 
functioning of the structures. In other words, previous studies paid less attention to the question 
of what actors do with the structures they have. We argue that the behaviour of actors within 
different institutional and organizational structures can differ and that trust in the employment 
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relationship is one important factor for differences in actors’ behaviour, which has been 
previously overlooked. In this sense, we will argue that the functioning and effects of 
institutional and organizational structures can produce different outcomes if there is trust 
between actors on both sides of the employment relationship (or not). Specifically, by focusing 
on the firm level it will be hypothesized that if there is mutual trust between the employee 
representation and the management, the effects of their interaction on the profitability of firms, 
is different. We will explain that the reason why trust changes outcomes is because it intensifies 
the quality and quantity of communication between the two sides, which then encourages them 
to share relevant information and creates a workplace partnership (e.g. Guest and Peccei, 2001). 
Such a workplace partnership in turn can foster problem-solving behaviour and enhances their 
willingness to make joint decisions and strike deals which may involve compromises and short 
term losses for one side, but also leads to long-term mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g. Fox, 
1974; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Kerkhof et al., 2003; Purcell, 1974).  
However, some institutional and organizational structures of the employment 
relationship, i.e. of some workplace employment relations regimes, are equipped with 
extensive information, consultation and even co-decision rights already. Therefore, 
communication between the two sides and their information sharing is intensified by inherent 
institutional characteristics of the regime in any case. Consequently, the role and importance 
of trust and its effects can be expected to vary across different regimes. In this sense, we 
consider the effect of trust to be potentially inimitable and therefore to be a potential functional 
equivalent to some workplace employment relations regimes.  
Thus, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of different institutional and 
organisational structures of the employment relationship by augmenting and complementing 
existing studies and adding a further perspective examining differences in the functioning of 
different institutional and organisational structures. We do this in order to solve further bits and 
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pieces in the puzzle of how and why similar structures lead to very different outcomes and, 
vice versa, why different structures can lead to the same outcome.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the role of trust for 
the functioning of the employment relationship. This section is followed by outlining the 
characteristics of different workplace employment relations regimes and the implications for 
the role of trust. Then, on basis of relevant literature we derive our hypotheses. This is followed 
by the presentation of the data and conceptualizations that enable our hypotheses tests. After 
presenting and discussing the results of our analysis and hypotheses tests, we finish by 
summarizing the main results and discuss the implications not only for current academic 
debates but also, as the question of the role of trust has (re-) entered recent political debates 
and initiatives, we outline the relevance of the results for political and policy making debates. 
 
The role of trust for the functioning of the employment relationship 
 
Trust is usually defined in literature as a perception that comprises the willingness to render 
oneself vulnerable to the other side on the expectation that the other side will not exploit this 
vulnerability (e.g. Dietz, 2004; Lyon et al. 2015; Rousseau et al., 1998; Sabel, 1993; Siebert et 
al, 2015).  On basis of this definition literature widely agrees that the existence of trust  is 
beneficial for the functioning of all kinds of organizations and therefore affects outcomes 
positively (e.g. Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Fukuyama, 1996; Lane and Bachmann 1998, Luhmann, 
1979, Möllering et al., 2004; Siebert et al. 2018).  
The general reason why trust is beneficial for the functioning of organizations is that 
it fosters efficient and constructive interaction between actors and encourages risk taking 
behaviour of actors which then affects organizational outcomes positively (e.g. Mayer et al., 
1995). In an intra-firm context, trust is argued to affect actors’ attitudes and behaviour in a way  
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that helps firms to attain their goals. The causal mechanisms behind are different and vary to 
the context but usually trust is argued to affect the motivation and efforts of employees and 
managers positively. In addition to that, other aspects such as loyalty to the firm and turnover 
are affected. (e.g. Davis et al., 2000; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Innocenti et al., 2010; Lane and 
Bachmann, 1998; Siebert et al., 2018; Tzafrir, 2005; Zaheer et al., 1998).  
Specifically, as regards the role of trust in the employment relationship, a similar 
positive effect is argued and empirical evidences reported in the literature. Some studies show 
that trust between actors on the two sides in the employment relationship facilitates the 
implementation of different Human Resource Management (HRM) practices and therefore is a 
key factor of ‘success’ (e.g. Dietz and Fortin, 2007; Holland et al., 2012; Kougiannou et al., 
2015; Morgan and Zeffane, 2003; Nienhueser and Hossfeld, 2011; Saunders and Thornhill, 
2003; Searle et al., 2011; Tzafrir, 2005). In addition to that, other studies even show that trust 
in the employment relation can even affect the financial performance of firms (e.g. Brown et 
al., 2015). 
The reason why trust between the employee and employer side is considered to have 
a beneficial effect is that it also changes actors’ behaviour accordingly. Specifically, if there is 
trust between the employee and employer side, it can be expected that the quality and quantity 
of communication between the two sides will improve (e.g. Taylor, 1989). This improvement 
in the communication then enables and fosters important information sharing (e.g. Butler, 
1995) and in turn encourages problem-solving behaviour (e.g. Kerkhof et al., 2003). In the 
employment relationship, this information sharing aspect is especially reinforced or constituted 
by trust between actors and can be considered beneficial as it also reduces information 
asymmetries which are regarded as one main contributor to costly (labour) conflicts between 
the employee and employer side (e.g. Godard, 1992).  
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Many of above beneficial effects of trust in the employment relationship only impact 
fully if there is mutual trust between the employee and employer side. In fact, it is mutual trust 
and not unilateral trust, i.e. if one side trusts the other side but not vice versa, that fosters 
constructive and efficient communication flows, reduces information asymmetries and in 
particular enables joint decisions, agreements and deals. In fact only mutual trust constitutes 
the basis for a mutual partnership (e.g. Guest and Peccei, 2001) which enables both sides to 
take risks in order to strike deals which might potentially involve short term losses for one 
party but which can lead to long-term mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g. Butler, 1995; 
Nienhueser and Hossfeld, 2011). Thus, it is mutual trust in particular and not necessarily 
unilateral trust alone that can be considered pivotal for any beneficial effect of trust in the 
employment relationship.  
However, trust is not the only source that constitutes and fosters communication and 
information sharing, joint decision-making and facilitates the two sides in the employment 
relationship in firms to strike deals. Some workplace employment relations regimes are 
equipped with extensive and legally backed information, consultation and even co-decision 
rights and obligations of the employee and employer side (e.g. Freeman and Medoff, 1984) 
which potentially have a similar beneficial effect to trust. Consequently, trust can be considered 
a functional equivalent to workplace employment relations regimes, which are legally. 
equipped with extensive information, consultation and even co-decision rights and obligations 
and therefore can be considered to have similar effects.  
This implies that there could be (at least) two forces that constitute and foster 
communication and information sharing, joint decision making and facilitate deals in firms and 
whether the two forces are complements or substitutes will depend upon the encompassment, 
degree and scale of the regime but also on the strength and degree of (mutual) trust. However, 
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given that the two sources are functional equivalents, the effect of trust might potentially be 
mitigated or even compensated for by some workplace employment relations regimes. 
 
The variety of workplace employment relations regimes 
 
The way that the employment relationship at the workplace level is voluntarily organized via 
different forms of partnership initiative or voice systems that aim to bring the employee and 
employer side together and/or institutionally regulated by law or even by the constitution, 
shows a high degree of variation across and within firms, sectors and countries. This variation 
also implies that the variation in how strong, pervasive and encompassing the information 
sharing, consultation, and co-decision rights and obligations of the employee and employer 
side are also varies substantially (e.g. Amossé et al., 2016; Aumayr et al., 2011; European 
Commission, 2015; Forth et al., 2017; Fulton, 2013; Meardi, 2018).  
In the following analysis we will concentrate on the role of trust in institutionally 
based workplace employment relations regimes only. This means that we are not analysing 
voice systems that are based on voluntary initiatives and actions by employees, trade unions or 
the management. d This means that in our analysis information sharing, consultation, and co-
decision rights and obligations of the employee and employer side can be considered as 
institutional characteristics in the sense that they are exogenously given and defined via 
national legal regulations and usually apply to all firms within a country (e.g. Crouch, 1993; 
Gallie, 2007; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Consequently, all firms within a country are considered 
to be embedded within the same workplace employment relations regime that is equipped with 
the same or very similar characteristics.  
Furthermore we will concentrate on a comparison of the role and effect of trust 
between the employee representation and the management in firms only. Methodologically, we 
 10 
compare differences in the role and effect of trust on basis of firms in different countries in two 
different regimes. This approach of comparing different firms in different regimes and 
countries is typical in comparative literature even though results have to be critically reviewed 
s not only comparability is not straightforward and even impeded in some cases but also 
empirical problems have to be considered (e.g. Cafferkey et al. 2020). Nevertheless, the large 
sample size we are using and the data generation process of the data provider, which will be 
explained in more detail later, should allow a high degree of comparability.  
However, the first one is a regime in which information sharing, consultation, and co-
decision rights and obligations of the employee and employer side are strong, pervasive and 
encompassing and in the second these rights and obligations are weak and/or even absent. Thus 
we are comparing the role and effect of trust between two extreme cases of institutional 
workplace employment relations regimes.  
These rights and obligations are strong in countries such as Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Slovenia, which are often grouped into a 
common form of workplace employment relations regime, which is frequently labelled as 
Social Partnership Regime (e.g. Bechter et al., 2012; European Commission, 2009). In these 
countries, a so-called dual channel system of employee side representation exists in the sense 
that the main actors on the employee side of the employment relationship are works councils 
and/or workplace trade unions. When works councillors in particular, who are elected by and 
from all employees and who are accountable to union and non-union members alike, are present 
at workplace level, this constitutes a strong and encompassing employee representation. 
Furthermore, works councillors in these countries enjoy not only high information and 
consultation rights, but also pervasive and strong co-decision and co-determination rights and 
obligations. In fact, in these countries, the latter rights and obligations are the highest in Europe, 
even higher than in Nordic countries. This means that in these countries firms are embedded in 
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a national workplace employment relations regime where the employment representation and 
the management are legally obliged and ‘bound’ to work together and have to make joint 
decisions and share information. For this reason trust is not the only source that leads to 
information sharing and joint decision making that lead to deals. Of course, there is not 
guarantee that these deals are successful and the existence of trust can be expected to be 
beneficial but since trust is not the only source we expect the role of trust to be less important 
in firms which are embedded in a Social Partnership Regime compared to firms in other 
regimes.    
It is important to underline that the role of trust can be considered to be potentially 
less important but not unimportant. Furthermore the fact that trust is potentially less important 
does not imply that the incidence of trust in the employment relationship is affected negatively. 
Quite the contrary, the incidence of trust can even be expected to be relatively high in firms 
that fall under a Social Partnership Regime. The reason for this is that the institutional 
characteristics of the regime, i.e. the obligation to regularly and continuously interact and work 
together and the need to find agreements on certain firm matters, can be expected to foster trust 
building and establish a (mutual gain) partnership (e.g. Bozic et al. 2019; Guest and Peccei, 
2001; Siebert et al. 2018). This is because trust is not something that is given to actors but is 
rather a social construction that (often slowly) develops through interactions over time by both 
sides (e.g. Fox, 1974; Lane and Bachmann, 1996; Laplante and Harrisson, 2008; Siebert et al. 
2018). Specifically, in the Social Partnership Regime, the employee representation (usually) 
meets and interact with the management not only regularly but also continuously over years. 
This continuous interactionenables both sides to send ‘signals’ of (cooperative) behaviour to 
the other side (Six and Sorge, 2008) and to develop experiences about the behaviour and 
reaction of the other side over time (Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011; Brattström et al. 2018; Dietz, 
2004; Swärd 2016). All of which also fosters trust building. Thus, the Social Partnership 
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Regime provides actors with a stable framework of continuous interaction in which trust can 
be built up and therefore it can be expected that the incidence of trust be relatively high 
compared to other regimes. 
As a counterpart to the Social Partnership Regime we chose the so called Polarised 
(or Mediterranean) regime which can be found in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
This regime is ideal for a comparison because information, consultation and co-decision rights 
are weak or often absent and therefore the role of trust can be considered (relatively) more 
important as there is no other institutional feature of the workplace employment regime that 
constitutes intensive information sharing and joint decision-making.  
A comparison of the role of trust between firms that are embedded in the Polarised 
Regime against firms in the Social Partnership Regime is also preferable as the incidence of 
employee representation is relatively high in firms that fall under both regimes. For example 
the incidence of institutionally based employee representation is very low in other countries in 
which information, consultation and co-decision rights are also low such as for example in the 
so called Liberal countries, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, and in Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC) (e.g. Meardi, 2018). A representative comparison of the role of 
trust in firms from Liberal and CEEC countries on the one hand with firms from countries with 
Social Partnership Regimes on the other hand is difficult especially because of the low 
incidence of institutionally based employee representation in such firms.   
 
The effects of trust on profitability in different workplace employment relations regimes: 
hypotheses  
 
The main aim of this study is to compare the role and effect of trust between firms in 
different workplace employment regimes. We will focus on the Polarised and the Social 
 13 
Partnership Regime regimes explained above and follow the conceptualization of regimes 
according to main literature (Aumayr et al. 2011; Bechter et al. 2012; European Commission 
2009; Forth et al. 2017). Methodologically and theoretically, comparing and analysing the role 
and effect of trust between groups of countries which fall into two distinct categories of 
workplace employment relations regimes has the main advantage that the complexity of the 
analysis can be reduced and the generalizability of the results increased. However, this 
categorization has the disadvantage, like categorizations in general, that not only the 
classification of one or the other country into a specific regime is partially questionable, but 
also that country variations which exist are omitted. Therefore, as regards the categorization of 
some countries, we tested the robustness of our results by excluding countries that are 
considered to be questionable. Our analysis therefore follows the established country 
classification into two distinct regimes predominantly used in the literature.  
We explained that one important difference between the Polarised and the Social 
Partnership Regime is that the latter provides a stable framework of regular and continuous 
interaction between the employee representation and the management. Against the background 
that this institutional characteristic can be considered beneficial for trust building (e.g. 
Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011; Bozic et al. 2019; Six and Sorge, 2008), our first hypothesis is:   
H1: The incidence of trust between the employee representation and the management 
is higher in firms which are embedded within a Social Partnership Regime compared 
to firms within a Polarised Regime.  
In line with the literature on the positive effects of trust per se (e.g. Brown et al., 2015; 
Fukuyama, 1996) we expected the incidence of any form of trust to be generally beneficial for 
firms. At the least, we expected that trust does not harm firms’ goals and performances. 
However, we further argued with respect to the role of trust in the employment relationship 
that the effect can be expected to rest strongly on mutual trust. The reason why we expected 
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mutual trust to be pivotal is that it not only fosters communication and information sharing, but 
it also lays the fundamental basis for a mutual gain workplace partnership (e.g. Guest and 
Peccei, 2001). This in turn enables problem solving behaviour and agreements on both sides 
and the ability to strike deals that might involve short-term losses for one side but which lead 
to long-term mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g. Butler, 1995; Nienhueser and Hossfeld, 2011). 
Against the background that unilateral trust does not suffice to make joint agreements and to 
strike deals, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Mutual trust between the employee representation and the management is 
associated with higher increases in firms’ profitability compared to the absence of 
trust and all other forms of unilateral trust.  
Because of methodological considerations we further expect that only strong mutual 
trust exerts a (statistically) significant effect and not necessarily (some) mutual trust. The 
reason for this is that, from a methodological perspective, the answer category ‘some trust’ 
potentially captures answers in the questionnaire survey that were affected by social 
desirability. Therefore, some trust in the other side should only be interpreted as an expression 
of a  weak form of trust that reflects  a ‘good’ or ‘normal’ (working) relationship which is 
characterized neither by  excessive conflict or great harmony.  Hence, the presence of some 
trust might not constitute a substantial change in actors’ behaviour that materializes in 
systematic differences in firms’ profitability increases. 
As regards, actors’ behaviour we explained that the beneficial impact of trust in the 
employment relationship on firms’ profitability increases, rests on its effect on actors’ 
behaviour. Specifically on the information sharing, joint decision and deal making behaviour. 
However, as explained, the same effect can also be constituted on the institutional obligation 
to do so which is inherent to the Social Partnership Regime. Thus, information sharing and co-
decision making can be constituted and encouraged either/or by trust or institutionally by the 
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regime. This means that if the information sharing and co-decision making is not institutionally 
provided, it can be constituted by trust between the actors and therefore trust can be considered 
a functional equivalent. However, given that the two sources are functional equivalents, the 
effect of trust might potentially be mitigated or even be compensated for by firms within the 
Social Partnership Regime but not (or at least to a lesser extent) within the Polarised Regime. 
Accordingly we formulize our third hypothesis that  
H3: The incidence of firms with profitability increases which are embedded in the 
Social Partnership Regime is less dependent upon variations in the incidence of 
different forms of trust compared to firms which are embedded in the Polarised 
Regime.  
In other words, while the likelihood that firms within the Social Partnership Regime enjoy 
increases in profitability depends only a little upon the incidence of any form of unilateral or 
multilateral trust, the likelihood of profitability increases for firms in the Polarised Regime 
depends largely (and  positively) on the incidence of (strong) mutual trust. 
 
Data and conceptualizations  
 
In the following empirical analysis, we use data from the 2013 wave of the European Company 
Survey (ECS) which is provided by Eurofound (2015). The ECS collects representative firm- 
or establishment-level data in all EU member states on employment relations and HRM issues 
including questions on the profitability of firms and on trust between the employee 
representation and the management.  
One main advantage and uniqueness of the ECS is that it is a large-scale matched 
employee representation and management data set and much attention was given to cross-
national comparability of data in the data collection process. For example, the questions in the 
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ECS questionnaire were translated into the native language of employee representatives and 
managers and particular attention given to consistency in the conceptualizations of the 
terminology used, which is important for many of the concepts and terms used in the survey, 
not least for trust. For details, see Eurofound (2015). 
The ECS considers differences in the economic structure and size of countries and 
therefore the sample sizes for countries vary accordingly. For the group of countries with a 
Social Partnership Regime, the sample sizes are (with the first number giving the number of 
managers; and the second, the number of employee representatives): Austria (1,100; 385), 
Belgium (1,107; 412), Germany (1,673; 345), Luxembourg (563; 224), the Netherlands (1,108; 
453), and Slovenia (550; 255). For the group of Polarised countries: France (1,657; 475), 
Greece (1,101; 144), Italy (1,652; 343), Portugal (1,103; 133), and Spain (1,651; 506). Even 
though the ECS is representative for all countries, the sample size for some countries, e.g. 
Luxembourg, is relatively small which makes the analysis of single countries problematic. 
Against this background, the alignment of the analysis along regimes finds further support as 
the sample size for the Social Partnership Regime is 6,101; 2074 and for the Polarised Regime 
is 7164; 1601.  
As regards the performance of firms, the ECS includes the question ‘Since the 
beginning of 2010 [in the past 3 years], has the financial situation of this establishment …’. 
Managers were asked to answer the question based on the following categories: ‘Improved’, 
‘Remained about the same’, ‘Worsened’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘No answer’. In the following analysis 
we will use the answer ‘Increased’ to this question as the basis for our dependent variable 
‘increase in firm profitability’. As with all performance measures, using increase in 
profitability in this specific conceptualization has advantages and disadvantages.  On the one 
hand, the used conceptualization does not consider the wide spectrum of beneficial effects trust 
may have on firm outcomes, but on the other, it is a frequently used indicator in similar analyses 
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of the effects of trust (e.g. Brown et al., 2015; Bryson, 2001; Guest et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the measure is, because of the nature of the survey, subjective and potentially biased. However, 
it has considerable validity given evidence from studies on similar measures of firm 
performance (e.g. Forth and McNabb, 2008; Wall et al., 2004).  
As regards trust, the ECS also collects unique data on trust between employee 
representatives and managers by asking the two sides ‘Please tell me - based on your 
experiences with the [employee representation/management] at this establishment - whether 
you agree or disagree?’ Both sides were given the following answer categories: ‘Strongly 
agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘No answer’. This means that 
the answer categories are also based on categorizations that are commonly used in literature 
(e.g. Brown et al., 2015; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Based on these answer categories, we will 
use the term strong trust in the other side if the answer ‘Strongly agree’ was given and some 
trust if the answer ‘Agree’ was given by the respondents. Furthermore, we will use the term 
mutual trust if trust is returned by the other side. This means if trust exist on both sides. Given 
that we differentiate between ‘some’ and ‘strong’ trust we also differentiate in our terminology 
accordingly between some and strong mutual trust.  
Even though the available data and operationalisations of variables from the ECS 
allows us to analyse different forms and directions of trust it also limits our analysis on trust 
between the employee representation on the employee side and the management on the 
employer side and not to all trust relationships in firms. Nevertheless, the data from the ECS 
allows us to test the hypotheses in a valid empirical analysis and the results are presented in 
the following.  
 
Results: Different regimes, different outcomes? 
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Figure 1 shows the incidence of different forms of trust in firms which are embedded in (a) the 
Social Partnership Regime and (b) in the Polarised Regime.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
As can be seen, the incidences of different forms of trust varies for both regimes. First 
of all we see that for almost all forms of unilateral and mutual trust the incidences are higher 
in the Social Partnership Regime. Specifically, the incidence of trust in the employee 
representation is 5, trust in the management is 10, strong trust in the employee representation 
11, and mutual trust 4 %-points higher in Social Partnership Regime than in the Polarised 
Regime. However, strong mutual trust in management is 7 %-points higher in the Polarised 
Regime and about the same between the two regimes for strong mutual trust. Apart from the 
latter form of trust, all these differences are also statistically significant. See Table 1 in the 
Appendix for tests on the statistical significance.  
This result implies support for H1 as the incidences are predominantly higher for the 
majority of different forms of trust, for firms that are embedded in the Social Partnership 
Regime.  Therefore, the Social Partnership Regime can be considered to provide a stable 
framework of continuous interaction between the employee representation and the 
management that fosters trust building between them. Even though the empirical results 
support H1, the differences in the incidence of trust between the two regimes are certainly not 
exorbitant and absolute as there are exceptions for some firms.  
However, the results in Figure 1 also show an interesting stylized fact that for both 
regimes, trust in the management is substantially lower than trust in the employee 
representation. This stylized fact holds for some and strong trust and points towards a 
systematic asymmetry in the trust relationship between the two sides in the employment 
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relationship. More specifically, it shows that the employee representation has less trust in the 
management than the management has in the employee representation. Without being able to 
discuss this stylized fact further, a second stylized fact is that all forms of strong trust are 
relatively rare in firms from both regimes. Strong mutual trust between the employee 
representation and the management is very rare as the incidence is at 2.8 % for the Social 
Partnership Regime and 3.9 % for the Polarised Regime. This very low incidence of strong 
mutual trust is of special interest as we hypothesized in H2 that it is strong mutual trust that is 
pivotal and materializes in systematic increases in firms’ profitability. As regards the empirical 
support for H2 we look at Figure 2. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 shows the incidence of firms in the two regimes that report increases in their 
profitability in the past three years. As can be seen, the share of firms with increases in their 
profitability in the case of the Social Partnership Regime is 30.7 % and in the case of the 
Polarised Regime 20.5 %. This direction of difference in profitability between the two regimes 
holds with one exception across differences in the incidences of different forms of trust. The 
exception is strong mutual trust. Table 2 in the Appendix shows that the differences between 
the two regimes are also statistically significant. The reasons for the difference in the incidences 
in the profitability of firms between the two regimes are certainly interesting and important, 
but would need an in-depth analysis that would overstretch this article. 
In order to investigate if different forms of trust are associated with differences in the 
incidence of profitability increases, we investigate if the incidence of profitability increases for 
different forms of trust is below or above the average using the share of profitability increases 
of all firms as a benchmark. In order to be able to investigate whether differences are 
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statistically significant we not only make use of a t-test but also check for the robustness using 
a bootstrap test. Against the background that literature suggests that further control variables 
do not systematically change results (e.g. Brandl 2020) this straightforward approach on 
looking and testing differences is advantageous. Figure 2 not only shows the benchmark (bold 
line) but also shows (with dashed lines) the (confidence) intervals using the standard deviation 
(over the different forms of trust sub samples). The latter are used as an indicator of a 
substantial deviation from the benchmark. The deviations from the benchmark are further 
analysed by bootstrap tests for which the 95% confidence intervals are given in Table 2 in the 
Appendix. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the share of firms that enjoy increases in their profitability 
is highest in those in which the employment relationship is characterized by strong mutual 
trust. In addition to that, Figure 2 also shows that strong mutual trust is the only form of trust 
in which the share of firms’ increases in profitability is substantially higher compared with all 
other forms. However, this result supports H2 as it shows that unilateral trust of either the 
employee representation or the management is not systematically associated with profitability 
increases nor does some mutual trust make a difference but, as hypothesized, only strong 
mutual trust does.  
Figure 2 also shows that the share of firms with profitability increases is not only 
highest in firms in which we find strong mutual trust between the employment representation 
and the management, but also that these high shares are of similar size in both regimes. From 
a statistical perspective, the shares of profitability increases do not differ significantly between 
the two regimes (see Table 2 in the Appendix for the significance test) but also the share is 
even slightly higher, with 37.5 % for firms that are embedded in the Polarised Regime 
compared with 33.3% for firms from the Social Partnership Regime.  
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This result not only fully supports H3 but also implies that strong mutual trust can be 
considered a functional equivalent to workplace employment relations regimes in which the 
two sides in the employment relationship are obliged to share information and to make joint 
decisions. This means our results show that if information sharing and co-decision making is 
not institutionally provided, it can be constituted by mutual trust and the effect on the ability 
of firms to increase their profitability is basically the same. 
 
 Conclusions and discussion 
 
This paper built upon previous studies on the effects and outcomes of different institutional 
and organizational structures in which the employment relationship is embedded and 
introduced the role and effect of trust between the employee and employer side at the firm level 
as an additional important factor to explain the effects of different workplace employment 
relations regimes. Thus, we augmented existing analyses by adding a further perspective 
examining differences in the functioning and effects of workplace employment relations 
regimes contingent on the incidence of different forms of trust.   
We argued that the reason why trust has an impact on outcomes of the employment 
relationship is that it intensifies the quality and quantity of communication between the two 
sides, which then encourages them to share relevant information. This in turn fosters problem-
solving behaviour and the willingness to make joint decisions and to strike deals that may 
involve compromises and short-term losses for one side, but ultimately lead to long-term 
mutually beneficial outcomes.  
However, we also argued that trust might not be necessary to achieve the same 
beneficial outcome as it is not the only factor that can constitute and foster communication and 
information sharing, joint decision making and facilitates the two sides in the employment 
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relationship in firms to strike deals. Some workplace employment relations regimes are 
equipped with extensive and legally backed information, consultation and even co-decision 
rights and obligations of the employee and employer side and therefore might be associated 
with a similar beneficial effect to trust. Thus, we argued that the role and effect of trust on the 
performance of firms is not inimitable but can be a potential functional equivalent to some 
workplace employment relations regimes in the absence of institutional information, 
consultation and co-decision rights and obligations. Furthermore, we argued that only mutual 
trust is relevant with respect to the effect on the profitability of firms and unilateral forms of 
trust are not sufficient as it takes both sides to strike decisive deals.   
We investigated our argument and tested hypotheses accordingly based on a unique 
matched employment representation/management data set at firm level. Specifically we 
analysed the effect of different forms of trust on profitability in more than 13,000 firms in 
eleven countries and compared two distinct regimes of workplace employment relations’ 
representation. While in the Social Partnership Regime the employee representation and the 
management are equipped with extensive and legally backed information, consultation and 
even co-decision rights and obligations, in the Polarised Regime these rights are weak or even 
absent.   
Our analysis showed that, first, the incidence of all forms of trust is higher in firms 
that are embedded in Social Partnership regime in comparison with firms in a Polarised 
Regime. This means that the incidence of all forms of trust is higher if the employment 
representation and the management work within an obligatory and stable institutional 
framework that is characterized by a continuous that allows them to build up trust.  
Second, not all forms of trust suffice to cause systematic increases in the profitability 
of firms. Our analysis showed that only mutual trust between the employee representation and 
the management is decisive as the incidence of mutual trust in firms is associated with 
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significantly higher increases in profitability. Thus, in contrast to some literature, our results 
with respect to trust in the workplace employment relationship indicate that trust is not a magic 
bullet and not just any form of trust is associated with beneficial effects: the economically 
beneficial effect is conditional on very strong and rare forms of trust.   
Third, the incidence of profitability increases in firms which are embedded in a 
workplace employment relations regime which is equipped with extensive information, 
consultation and even co-decision rights - such as the Social Partnership Regime – as well as 
in firms in which the workplace employment relationship is characterized by strong mutual 
trust, independent of the regime including the Polarised Regime. In other words, if we find 
strong mutual trust in firms from the Polarised Regime, the effect on the likelihood for 
profitability increases is similar to firms from the Social Partnership Regime. This result 
indicates that mutual trust can be considered a functional equivalent to the institutional 
information sharing and joint decision-making features that are inherent to the Social 
Partnership Regime.  
Taken together, these results not only enable us to solve further bits and pieces of  the 
puzzle on how and why similar regimes lead to very different outcomes and vice versa why 
different regimes can lead to the same outcome, but our results also have academic and political 
implications.  
Academically, the results indicate that it is not sufficient for any assessment of the 
outcomes of different workplace employment relations regimes to consider only the 
institutional and organisational structure of regimes. Our results clearly showed that it is also 
advantageous for a better and deeper understanding of the effects of the employment 
relationship to consider factors that account for the functioning of the regimes such as, in 
particular, trust. In this sense we were able to show in the spirit of Jon Elster (1989) that both 
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specific characteristics of a workplace employment relations regime and mutual trust can serve 
as a ‘cement’ in the employment relationship which leads to the same outcomes and effects.  
Politically, the results indicate that some policy advice and in particular some recently 
imposed institutional reforms of employment relations regimes in some countries might not 
have been necessary as alternative and potentially less conflictual pathways are available for 
policy-making in order to increase the performance of firms. Against the background that 
employment relations regimes in countries with a Polarised Regime such as for example Greece 
and Portugal were reformed with the motive of increasing the performance of firms (e.g. 
Marginson, 2015; Meardi, 2018) our results indicate that the necessity and even the success of 
some aspects of these reforms are questionable. In fact, our results show that it might have been 
sufficient and politically easier to implement if trust building between actors on both sides of 
the employment relationship would have been supported by the government. This also means 
that the ‘imposition’ of institutional reforms, which not only lead to confusion among actors 
but also to significant social unrest and costs for the economy and society (ILO and OECD, 
2018), were not necessarily needed.  
However, without being able to assess the advantages and disadvantages of any 
institutional reform of country specific institutional and organisational structures of the 
employment relationship, the results of this paper show that mutual trust in the employment 
relationship is associated with beneficial economic effects for firms and therefore trust building 
should be supported and fostered. There are, of course, various ways to support and foster trust 
building that might be explored, but this study showed that one particular way is the provision 
of a stable and continuous institutional framework that allows the two sides in the employment 
relationship to interact in a way that enables both to achieve long-term beneficial outcomes. 
Moreover, and given the fact that strong mutual trust is not only decisive but also very rare and 
fragile, as trust is not a given but often develops over a long time, existing trust relationships 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. The incidence of different forms of trust in firms. 
 
(a) Social Partnership Regime 
 
 
(b) Polarised Regime 
 
Note: Bars show the percentage of firms which fall under (a) the Social Partnership regime and (b) the Polarised 
Regime in which the employee representation or the management has either some and/or strong trust in the other 
side as well as there is (strong) mutual trust. Data source: Eurofound (2015). 
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Figure 2. The incidence of firms with increases in profitability (in percentages). 
 
(a) Social Partnership Regime 
 
 
(b) Polarised Regime 
 
Note: ‘All Firms’ shows share of firms with increases in the profitability compared with all firms; ‘Firms with 
Employee Representation’ shows share of firms with increases in the profitability compared with all firms with an 
employee representation; ‘Firms with Trust in Management’ shows share of firms with increases in the profitability 
in which the employee representation has trust in management compared with all firms with an employee 
representation; ‘Firms with Trust in Employee Representation’ shows share of firms with increases in the 
profitability in which the management has trust in the employee representation compared with all firms with an 
employee representation; ‘Firms with Mutual Trust’ shows share of firms with increases in the profitability in 
which there is mutual trust between the employee representation and the management compared with all firms 
with an employee representation; ‘Firms with Strong Mutual Trust’ shows share of firms with increases in the 
profitability in which there is strong mutual trust between the employee representation and the management 
compared with all firms with an employee representation; All shares are in percentages. Solid lines show the 
average incidence of firms with profitability increases over all firms. Dashed lines show upper and lower bounds 
[28.7; 32.7] for (a) and [13.0; 28.0] for (b) using the standard deviation over all sub-samples. Standard deviation 
for (a) = 2.0 and for (b) = 7.5. Bootstrap tests (on basis of 1000 samples) give a 95% confidence interval of [29.5; 




Table 1. Regime comparison of the incidence of different forms of trust. 
 Social Partnership Regime  Polarised Regime  t-test for Differences between Regimes 
 Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean  Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean  Difference t-value p-value 
Trust in Employee Representation 91.93 27.25 0.50  86.82 33.83 0.61  5.11 6.437 0.000 
Trust in Management 84.82 35.90 0.89  74.98 43.33 1.21  9.84 6.546 0.000 
Strong Trust in Employee Representation 27.87 44.84 0.83  17.34 37.86 0.69  10.53 9.799 0.000 
Strong Trust in Management 9.88 29.85 0.74  16.71 37.32 1.05  -6.83 -5.339 0.000 
Mutual Trust 77.54 46.63 1.17  73.41 44.29 1.27  4.13 2.996 0.003 
Strong Mutual Trust 2.83 16.60 0.42  3.93 19.43 0.56  -1.1 -1.575 0.115 
Note: Means are in percentage. Std. denotes Standard and Dev. Deviation. See notes in Figure 1 for further information on data and source.  
 
Table 2. Regime comparison of firms with increases in the profitability dependent on different forms of trust. 
 Social Partnership Regime  Polarised Regime  t-test for Differences between Regimes 
 Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean  Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean  Difference t-value p-value 
All Firms 30.70 46.13 0.64  20.53 40.40 0.51  10.17 12.381 0.000 
Firms with Employee Representation 28.81 37.28 0.51  19.83 29.95 0.38  8.98 10.559 0.000 
Firms with Trust in Management 28.79 12.01 0.19  21.37 9.10 0.13  7.42 2.786 0.005 
Firms with Trust in Employee Representation 28.63 22.47 0.34  20.18 16.76 0.22  8.45 6.073 0.000 
Firms with Mutual Trust 29.11 28.73 0.45  21.82 18.17 0.25  7.29 10.933 0.000 
Firms with Strong Mutual Trust 33.34 6.05 0.10  37.46 5.84 0.08  -4.12 0.204 0.838 
Note: Means are in percentage. Std. denotes Standard and Dev. Deviation. See notes in Figure 2 for further information on data and source. 
 
